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New Media, New Publics? 
An Introduction to Supplement 14 
 
Charles Hirschkind, University of California at Berkeley 
Maria José A. de Abreu, Columbia University 
Carlo Caduff, King’s College London 
 
Abstract 
In this special issue, we examine how publics are brought into being through historically 
specific media practices. We treat the question of new media as an invitation to explore 
changing conditions of communication across a number of ethnographic locations. We 
argue that these changing conditions have challenged our capacity to understand the 
nature of publics. It is important to emphasize that none of the contributors perceive new 
media as a coherent object of attention that can easily be isolated as an entity; nor do they 
locate its novelty in its digital format. Instead, they examine modes of mediation that 
entail the technological but are not reducible to it. This approach allows anthropologists 
to keep the referent of new media open and remain attentive to emerging forms of public 
life that are working outside of or adjacent to the logics of both the digital and the 
technological. Our hope is that this collection of essays contributes to an anthropological 
understanding of media that illuminates important aspects of the political economic 
present, attends to the erosion and reanimation of anonymity in public life, and captures 
dynamics of staging, projection, and response within and across ethnographic sites. 
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In the opening scenes of Fahrenheit 451, firefighters raid a private home in search of 
books to burn. They are trainees whose search concentrates on the hiding places favored 
by those who illegally keep books in the interior of electric devices like lamps or heaters. 
In a scene of the film, a firefighter takes off the screen of a TV set and finds in its hollow 
space a stack of books. Instead of drawing our attention to the technological apparatus of 
the television we are directed to another medium: the book.  
Made in 1966, two years after the publication of Understanding Media, Truffaut’s 
filmic adaptation of Bradbury’s book (Bradbury 1953) visually recasts McLuhan’s 
famous dictum that one medium’s content is always another medium (McLuhan 1964). It 
does so, however, by burrowing out the television medium of its content. Perhaps by 
remediating into film a book about books, Truffaut really believed that, despite its greater 
combustibility, film would survive and help preserve the book as an object under threat, 
not unlike microphotography did in the past to counter the perishability of paper. 
What we are told in the film, however, is that the prime reason why books must 
be burnt has to do with the effects they produce upon the reading public. “Books disturb 
people. They make them anti-social,” says Montag, the film’s main character. The view 
of the authorities, we learn, is that books unnecessarily deepen and complexify the 
emotional and intellectual life of their readers, creating an obstacle to the light cheeriness 
and shallow conversation that make social happiness possible. Moreover, as fire chief 
Captain Beatty asserts, books are unfit to accommodate the rhythms brought by new 
media. The new technology in question is interactive television, a device that extends 
across much of the interior wall space within the home. Instead of the encumbering 
depths of human experience encountered in the book, television captivates its audience 
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with banal, mind numbing programs engineered to engender and protect the shallow 
psychology upon which both happiness and social harmony depend.  
Surveillance is omnipresent in Truffaut’s imagined future. Throughout the entire 
film, a dim spot light illuminates the center of the screen, framing the action’s capture by 
media, and signaling the presence of an invisible gaze originating at the same location 
occupied by the film’s spectator. Within this panoptic dystopia, speech rarely retains a 
content beyond its merely phatic function, its telegraphic economy and predictability (its 
digital simplicity, we might say) mirroring the operations of the technological media that 
condition and produce it. Truffaut’s dystopian view about the forms of interactivity 
engendered within this techno-mediatic milieu are dramatized in the title sequence scenes 
where the highly mechanical male voice reciting the credits overlaps with the camera’s 
abrupt zooming in onto the TV antennas that sit atop the roofs. Here mechanized, 
authoritarian speech telescopes down its essential aspect, the material conditions of its 
broadcast, represented in the antennae. 
Despite its hierarchical model of communication, the themes and anxieties that 
traverse Fahrenheit 451 are strikingly contemporary with our own techno-mediatic 
moment: the fascination with new forms of interactive media, the threat of displacement 
of one medium by another, tensions between progress and preservation, the specter of 
mass surveillance and authoritarian rule lurking behind the seductive surface of new 
technologies, and the ever-present fear of losing touch with ourselves and others. In light 
of this continuity of experience across more than five decades, scholars increasingly 
wonder what is new in new media. How can this elusive category be circumscribed? 
While many scholars have taken up the problem of definition, we believe that the 
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analytical force of the category “new media” lies precisely in its resilience and seduction, 
less in the answers it may offer than the questions it enables us to pose anew regarding 
our political economic present.  
 
Under the Spell  
Listening to the latest pronouncements of the prophets of technological revolution, it 
seems that we are on the verge of a new age. The epochal transformation that is 
presumably unfolding today corresponds with the rise of new media and the connectivity 
and interactivity it is making possible. The benefits that the technological infrastructure 
of communication promises to provide us are vast: more equality, freedom and 
democracy, better education, a radical extension and enrichment of our social 
relationships, an intensification and proliferation of our pleasures. Today, “hundreds of 
millions of people are, each minute, creating and consuming an untold amount of digital 
content” (Schmidt and Cohen 2014) (p. 3). The exceptional speed of transmission and the 
unprecedented scale of circulation are driving “one of the most exciting social, cultural, 
and political transformations in history” (Schmidt and Cohen 2014) (p. 4).  
The breathless optimism animating this type of new media discourse can sustain 
quite contradictory perceptions about the achievements that media portend. What some 
endorse passionately as an opportunity to empower consumers and bring competition to 
the market, others promote as a unique possibility to end poverty and reboot democracy. 
Ruminations about Facebook and Twitter revolutions cast corporate websites as 
platforms for progressive politics (Gerbaudo 2012) (p. 2). It is the almost unlimited faith 
in the power of modern technology that enables new media discourse to reconcile such 
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diverse views.  
At the heart of this discourse is an enduring fascination with technology, 
envisioned as an autonomous source of social, cultural, and political change. As the 
primary cipher by which the progressive movement of modernity is measured and 
celebrated, technology is invested with extraordinary powers to solve the problems that 
afflict societies (Larkin 2008; Mrázek 2002; Nye 1994). As such, it is made to embody 
the utopian dreams that undergird the teleology of modernity. This fascination for the 
technological occurs in tandem with a radical overvaluation, or misrecognition, of its 
consequences, evident in an overemphasis on technological solutions, and a concomitant 
neglect of the political and economic determinants of social problems. Yet, despite, or 
perhaps because of its frequent failure to perform the role of magic bullet assigned to it, 
technology remains a persistent object of investment.  
Today, new media bear the promise of universal political enfranchisement in the 
form of “access,” the term by which projects of democratic inclusion are being 
reimagined and reengineered (Hansen 2004; Logan 2010; Coleman 2010; Barney, 
Coleman, Ross, Sterne, Tembeck 2015; Kelty 2017). Political and economic divides are 
increasingly recast as digital divides. Humanitarian efforts to diminish the entrenched 
inequalities between North and South find new optimism in the project of extending the 
infrastructure of digital technology around the globe. Access to the latest media 
technologies is assumed to determine whether one is an agent of history or a silent 
passenger, and thus, whether one is living in the present or the past (Strassler 2010; 
Mazzarella 2010, Mattelart 2000). 
Sutured to a liberal democratic imaginary, the notion of new media performs an 
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ideological function deeply informed by the concepts of civil society and the public 
sphere. Indeed, contrasting usage of the closely linked terms social media and new media 
parallel distinctions associated with these two concepts. On the one hand, social media, 
like civil society, articulate a domain of social engagement outside the sphere of state 
power, a space idealized as a site of human agency and emancipation, grounded in 
relationships of unfettered, unregulated social and economic exchange. As in the 
capitalist market from which it derives, value here is understood to be determined on the 
basis of practices of free exchange. On the other hand, new media give shape to a public 
sphere where citizens may encounter one another in abstraction from the conditions of 
differential wealth and power that divide them, and may, through their discursive 
interactions within this arena, exercise political agency. New media holds out the promise 
of a revolution that will allow people to be directly involved in the institutions that shape 
the conditions of their lives, to realize the potential that old media failed to achieve 
(Gitelman 2006; Coleman 2010; Aouragh, 2011). 
Passing beyond equally simplistic condemnations and celebrations in our 
explorations, we refused the temptation to come up with an answer and assume a stable 
referent for the entity called “new media.” Instead, we approached the new as a form of 
expectation oriented towards the future, as ever-receding horizon of what’s to come. We 
concluded that it is important, both analytically and politically, for any anthropological 
account to read the new in new media not in a sequential sense, but in a structural one. 
The future orientation that is so characteristic for the speculative economy of 
technological modernity creates the endless frontier that is driving consumer capitalism 
today. Much like the consuming subject who strains towards, without ever arriving at a 
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state of full satisfaction, so the lure of the new lies in its constant deferral into the future. 
The promise of the new, therefore, hinges less on the possibility of its arrival than, 
paradoxically, on its capacity to withdraw; less a stage or point in time than a structural 
movement that keeps alive the desire for the new itself.  
This desire for the new is of course itself highly mediated. The new is grounded in 
the conditions of the present that assign it such a status (Caduff 2015). This means that 
the new is not only that which is staged as new, but also the very apparatus through 
which such staging occurs. It is a mode of engagement with time itself through the 
medium of the new. It suggests a scene of potentiality, a place for projection and 
response that can extend in multiple directions. For example, when we refer to a 
particular technology as new, its newness may actually imply different orientations to 
time. Television (particularly news broadcasting) is a medium that potentializes the 
present around indeterminate futures (Doanne 2006; De Abreu 2013). This stands in 
contrast to the noeme that Roland Barthes associated with photography’s temporal quality 
of pastness, or film with its forward motion (Barthes 1981). Thus, the question of the new 
is not simply a historical one (when was a technology new?). The question of the new is a 
question about forms of mediation and how these forms themselves structure orientations 
in time.   
Secondly, the newness of new media emerges from the open and unpredictable 
nature of media processes and the ability of these processes to interact and interrupt each 
other. The experience of newness is an experience of instability and interference. This 
means that the question of new media raises questions not about technological things that 
can be isolated as distinct entities but about relationships among media practices and 
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processes of mediation. 
Accordingly, the new media stories that readers will encounter in this issue are 
neither stories about laptops, tablets, and smartphones nor tales from Facebook, Twitter, 
and Flickr. Our aim is to reach beyond concerns commonly invoked by the pundits of 
new media and their fetishistic focus on new technology. Indeed, our considerations of 
the semiotic specificities traversing older and newer media only confirmed the 
unproductive nature of such a divide. As McLuhan noted, “a new medium is never an 
addition to an old one, nor does it leave the old one in peace” (McLuhan 1964) (p. 174). 
Depriving the new of its sequential sense allows us to undercut the exceptional status of 
the present, and thus avoid the perception of new media as singularly powerful 
technologies of social, cultural, and political transformation. Instead, the contributors to 
this special issue concentrate on interactions and interruptions that mark moments of 
public life in specific places at specific times.  
In their essays, Kajri Jain, Patricia Spyer, and Martin Zillinger investigate 
relationships among media, which have made processes of mediation a focus of public 
life itself. In her account of monumental roadside statues, Kajri Jain explores the way in 
which agonistic media have emerged over the past two decades in India (Jain 2017). 
What the massive monuments of mostly Hindu deities reveal are social antagonisms, 
which they expose and intensify. Drawing on historical and ethnographic research, Jain 
traces the emergence of a public that relies on religious patronage, paternalist projects of 
development, and populist politics. Tracing the proliferation of monumental statues 
across India’s network of highways, she calls our attention to the interplay between these 
two forms, how, for example, gigantic religious icons are painted with the same color as 
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modern cars, in ways that aesthetically as well as historically suggest a circuit between 
the old and the new, the static and the mobile, a circuit that is generating its own 
turbulences.  
In her essay on the aesthetic of the cut and the accident, Patricia Spyer engages 
two media forms (Spyer 2017). The first media form is the Muslim VCD circulated in 
wartime Maluku, Indonesia, the second the Muslim Power mural. If the former’s 
narrative unfolds through interruption and discontinuity, enabled technically by means of 
jump-cuts and close-ups, the latter, by contrast, aspires to permanence and continuity. 
Spyer goes on to suggest that there is a relation between those two economies of the 
aesthetic whereby the cut in the former contrasts with the desired wholeness and integrity 
of the latter. But despite such differences on a formal level both aesthetic regimes 
integrate a constitutive indeterminancy as part and parcel of what Spyer calls “an 
accidental public.” Both Jain and Spyer affirm the notion that any medium is at once a 
site in its own right, as well as a complex of agonistic relationships with other processes 
of mediation that prevents the substitution of one medium by another.  
In Martin Zillinger’s essay we find a similar tension between expansion and 
containment (Zillinger 2017). In Zillinger’s study the competition is between trance 
entrepreneurs in Morocco who seek to generate publicity while circumscribing it within 
the bounds of morally and politically acceptable arenas that define a public in local terms. 
The bodily movements of the entranced are deeply shaped by the audio and visual media 
that are deployed in spiritual music performances. Zillinger then shows how ritual 
reliability can be maintained across multiple sites through the capacity of technology to 
adjust to local contingencies. This means that media do not simply frame rituals of trance, 
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but play an integral role in the production of transitions—and of transgressions—between 
different spheres of ritual practice. Together these three essays examine publics that 
replicate certain forms of the bourgeois public sphere but also depart from it. They 
suggest that the changing conditions of communication are challenging our capacity to 
understand the nature of publics. 
 
From Publics to Publicness 
The enthusiasm with which scholars turned to publics two decades ago, a turn often 
associated with the event of the publication in English of Jürgen Habermas’ The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Habermas 1989), has been superseded 
by a certain nervousness and skepticism over the adequacy of the notion to the 
contemporary political and mediatic moment. This discomfort is registered in the 
increasing recourse to a variety of concepts that serve to reframe questions previously 
explored through the lens of the public: networks, crowds, swarms, infrastructure, the 
multitude (Borch 2006; Hardt and Negri 2004; Larkin 2013; Law and Hassard 1999; 
Mazzarella 2010; van Dijk 1999).  
One explanation for this loss of faith in both the liberatory and explanatory power 
of the concept of the public owes to a heightened anxiety regarding the central 
dichotomies of liberal political thought: identity and anonymity, freedom and control, and 
most dramatically, public and private. While a tension and instability between these 
binary terms is hardly novel, and indeed, may be seen as an essential feature of liberal 
governance, the current insecurity and volatility of the boundaries and practices 
authorized by these notions has rendered them a particularly productive site for 
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contemporary liberal inquiry, evident in the proliferation of scholarly and popular 
discourses on the dissolution of private life. These discourses also highlight how the 
contemporary compulsion to capture and disseminate on social media every aspect of 
personal life has made it increasingly difficult to recognize and sustain those features of 
self and society that cannot be accommodated within the formats and protocols of such 
media (Ravetto-Biagioli 2013). The very impulse to surrender nearly everything for 
public viewing is increasingly engineered into digital infrastructures. Our cell phones, for 
example, are jammed with an increasing number of applications all of which encourage 
and facilitate the choice to publicly disseminate every personal impression, encounter, 
and event through the latest social media channels (Wasik 2015).  
Secondly, the felt erosion of prior logics of public and private is being further 
propelled by the fact that the digital technologies upon which many everyday activities 
increasingly depend collect and archive untold quantities of information about us and 
make it available to interested parties, whether corporate or state. Through tracking and 
data-mining software found throughout the devices we use, we involuntarily transmit a 
record of ourselves to unknown individual, commercial, and governmental interests, 
including whom and when we call, what online content we view, where we travel, what 
we buy, where we stay, and so on. Such practices of data-collection make personal 
preferences, desires, habits, patterns of attention, uptake, and response visible to others, 
and hence further undermine the possibility of claiming a space of immunity from the 
illumination of publicity. We seem increasingly caught in forms of communication that 
encourage us to digitally surrender ever more dimensions of what we may consider to be 
our personal lives. The electronic footprints left by our fashion whims, political 
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solidarities, hobbies, medical worries and sexual appetites illuminate our lives in ways 
that destabilize prior organizations of visibility and obscurity upon which key dimensions 
of our subjectivity relied. The information gathered on our personal passions, desires, and 
interests by corporations are recursively deployed to structure and modify the online 
environments we inhabit, so as to better anticipate our proclivities in a manner conducive 
to increased profit-taking by corporations. The search engines that we have at our hands 
seem to already know what we wish to know. The dream of personalized advertisement is 
not to transform our proclivities, but to capture our preferences, anticipate our desires, 
and present us with a perfect profile of ourselves. Thus, the indetermination, 
unpredictability, and openness we value in public interaction is felt to be increasingly 
circumscribed by norms emanating from the algorithms of corporate strategists.  
As many authors have emphasized, the public and the private are not stable 
sociological or political domains; these terms operate as flexible evaluative grid (Gall 
2002; Meyer and Moors 2006; Cody 2011; Povinelli 2006; Agamben 2015). The 
analytical and rhetorical labor that these terms perform is always relative to the 
ethnographic contexts in which they are deployed as ideological frame to assign value to 
specific objects and practices. This is not to say, of course, that contemporary forms of 
data-collection do not pose a threat to key dimensions of a liberal political order; only 
that such a threat cannot be analyzed in terms of a dissolution of a clear and stable 
boundary between public and private. 
Thirdly, as the NSA documents published by Edward Snowden dramatically 
brought to light, digital technologies have enabled an expansion and intensification of 
practices of state surveillance centered on the collection of the electronic metadata 
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generated in every digitally mediated act we undertake. In the so-called War on Terror, 
every person is now a potential suspect who is automatically subjected to secret 
surveillance programs with potentially unlimited reach. Enabled by the latest data mining 
software programs, governments around the globe scan and analyze vast databases 
assembled from computer, cell phone, and credit card use, allowing state intelligence 
agencies to create complex maps of our social connections, political or religious 
affiliations, travel, employment, and other aspects of personal life.  
In addition, states are increasingly involved in new forms of online intervention 
beyond surveillance. While state practices of regulating and censoring web based content 
are the most overt forms of this intervention, state intelligence agencies are also involved 
in a wide range of digital activities, among them, the creation of fake online persona 
aimed at shaping online conversation; developing hacking capabilities that allow access 
to, or the subversion of, corporate or state institutional targets; and the mass 
dissemination of state propaganda within social media channels. 
Critical accounts of surveillance typically insist on the value of privacy. Yet 
privacy is not a remedy; it is the instrument that enables security concerns to expand to 
ever more domains of our personal life (Lippert and Walby 2013). Exemplary is the 
growing wariness around exposure to electronic surveillance and control that has become 
a concern of ordinary citizens who are worried about possible intrusions into their 
privacy. Technologies of electronic evasion and content deletion are now marketed as 
indispensable instruments of citizenly prudence, similar to home insurance and 
investment diversification. More and more people today seek out ways to cover their 
tracks, to disguise their online presence, both through such technological means as 
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encryption software, and by attempting to ensure that their digital selves remain as 
incoherent and indecipherable as possible across the diverse channels of communication 
they use. The amorphous threat against which we are encouraged to protect ourselves 
seems to embrace everything from corporate spies, to independent data thieves, to the 
state itself. The global market for security solutions is expanding exponentially. Such 
solutions regulate, and thus enable, the circulation of information. What these solutions 
offer to the concerned citizen is a form of strangerhood, enabled by the same 
technologies that are threatening to abolish it. Once celebrated as an instrument of our 
unbridled mobility across the digital frontier, the avatar has now become the cage that 
may well entrap us.  
And yet, it is worth remembering here that the avatar has always been bound up 
with the development and expansion of new technologies of information gathering and 
archive creation, its promise of anonymity always conditioned by expanding possibilities 
for identifying, knowing, and serving its users. From this perspective, contemporary 
anxieties around the avatar might be understood less as a symptom of a disappearing 
anonymity than as cipher of the rapidly shifting and unpredictable balance between 
visibility and obscurity within today’s media ecology. 
Michael Warner noted that the concern with personal freedom encourages people 
to “identify both themselves and their politics with privacy” (Warner 2005) (p. 193). This 
identification with privacy has resulted in a growing demand for personal security. The 
purpose of security, as a political necessity and technological challenge, is to create a 
“private public sphere” (Warner 2005). And that, it seems, is exactly what social media 
offer: the fantasy of a space of communication made up of private public spheres where 
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one can enjoy the freedom of sharing snippets of one’s life with friends and followers. 
Those who engage in practices of public “life streaming” do not necessarily think of 
themselves as speaking to strangers. What they typically imagine as address amounts to a 
“post-public sphere public” (Berlant 2011) (p. 223).  
Rosalind Morris suggests that the current conditions require us to think 
“publicness beyond the public sphere, in the nonspaces of a networked world” (Morris 
2006) (p. 100). What Morris foregrounds is a type of speech that operates independent of 
the social imaginary of the classic public sphere. This form of speech does not address 
strangers, nor does it require the speaker to assume the disembodied identity of a public 
subject. As Morris notes, social media “enable communication without relation, 
connection without mediation” (Morris 2013) (p. 106). The practice of posting makes it 
possible for people to publish updates on their personal and professional lives. The 
subject engaged in such a form of publicness “does not speak as appears to be speaking,” 
the visibility of the speech trumping, if not out rightly eclipsing, the content of what is 
said (Morris 2015). Sustained by a sensory epistemology privileging the visual over the 
verbal register, contemporary digital fora foster practices of self-presentation and self-
revelation bereft of the dialectics of representation and transfiguration that secured the 
agency and coherence of earlier political mobilizations. As a consequence, mass 
mobilizations today, often established through such practices as crowd sourcing or the 
viral text-messaging, spring to life with little relation between participants other than the 
collective recitation of the rally slogans that brought them out to begin with.  
This compulsion to make oneself visible within social media supports a withering 
of the dialogic forms of engagement, a shift to an ideology of publicity that emphasizes 
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connectivity and circulation over relationality and response. Digital platforms invite 
people to show up, to visibly present themselves within spaces geared more toward 
exhibition and exposure than representation and transfiguration, and with little incentive 
to open oneself up to the uncertainties and contingencies of reciprocal relations.  
The social aspect of social media is primarily defined in relation to icons of 
human interaction and intimacy, like “friends,” “followers,” “contacts,” or “users” 
(Barker 2008; Chesher 2015). Whereas readers of Baudrillard would see this form of 
technological sociability as little more than simulacrum, others more inspired by Kittler’s 
materialist thinking would reject at the outset any association of technology with a form 
of sociality (Lovink 2012). For many observers, however, particularly in the aftermath of 
the Arab Spring, the promise of social media lies in its capacity to facilitate collective 
organization, civic engagement, and political action. Online movements deploy 
communication technologies for fundraising, lobbying, rallying, campaigning, and 
community building. But to what extend has this explosion of publicness brought (new) 
publics into being?  
Rebecca Stein and Joseph Masco examine this question carefully in their 
contributions (Stein 2017; Masco 2017). Stein focuses on the Israeli army and looks at 
the ways in which it increasingly deploys digital cameras as public relations technologies 
to counter international reporting about its military operations in the occupied territories. 
The challenge for human rights organizations which work in and on the same terrain is to 
reveal what the army’s combat camera obscures. Significantly, both sides share an over-
reliance on and an over-investment in the visual. The power of the image to uncover the 
truth is typically taken for granted. But the saturation of the visual field by networked 
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technologies and the overwhelming stimulation of the senses have created a new opacity 
and contributed to a growing numbness. As Stein argues, the new photographic devices 
fail to do their work; they fail to deliver on their communicative promise. Paradoxically, 
the demand for more cameras goes along with a demand for less seeing. Visibility has 
become a fetish disabling the political (Dean 2002). 
Similarly, Masco emphasizes that today’s media refrain of constant crisis has lost 
its ability to motivate people and galvanize effective political action (Masco 2017). 
Focusing on two of the most important existential dangers of our time, nuclear extinction 
and climate change, Masco suggests that the inability to address these threats signals a 
new modality of governmentality that can accommodate failure without generating a 
demand for fundamental structural change. In America’s media cultures, the language of 
crisis has become “a means of stabilizing an existing condition rather than minimizing 
forms of violence.” Together, Stein’s and Masco’s contributions highlight the pressure of 
public communication to constantly renew the sense of the new by virtue of an endless 
stream of information that only intensifies the growing saturation, obsolescence, and 
numbness that increasingly characterizes contemporary media cultures.  
The speed and scale of much of today’s media work against processes of 
collective self-formation that undergirded a modernist political imaginary and that 
contributed to the transformation of the space of public existence, the constitution of a 
shared perspective among strangers, the honing of aptitudes and affective attachments 
that inform and empower a political project. Today’s techno-mediatic conditions tend to 
undermine the conditions of intersubjective engagement needed to engender these forms 
of collective action and appraisal. While this in itself is not new, and indeed has been 
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noted by many theorists of capitalism (see, among others, (Crary 2013), contemporary 
media environments intensify this process in the types of communication and interaction 
they mediate. 
 
Politics and the Political 
Any engagement with the question of new media must include the politics of media 
systems but also the mediation of the political as such (Rafael 2003; Hirschkind and 
Larkin 2008; Hull 2012; Spadola 2013). Within the democratic tradition that so 
powerfully defines and circumscribes the contemporary scope of our political 
imagination, the political potential of new media is often seen to pivot upon the question 
of participation: that is, on the extent to which people are directly involved in the 
institutions that shape the conditions of their own existence. Often obscured in this view, 
however, is the fact that what gets refracted as direct is both determined by, and 
contingent upon, the structures that mediate and condition it.  
A key aim in Chris Kelty’s contribution is to show how the current trend to think 
about participation as primarily a technological matter, a feature of our devices that is 
either working or not, impoverishes a much deeper tradition of thought built upon this 
concept (Kelty 2017). As Kelty reminds us, participation is densely woven into styles of 
political argument, legitimating discourses, and forms of identity. In his essay, 
participation appears as a mid-level concept, one that operates in the interstices between 
political philosophy and administrative science, keeping a foot in each. From political 
philosophy, it draws sustenance from ideas about the conditions of human flourishing; 
from administration, it remains attentive to the practicalities of efficiency, control, and 
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productivity. In this sense, it is entrusted to mediate and resolve the irresolvable 
oppositions of liberal society, between administration and freedom, bureaucracy and 
justice. It allows people to hold together aspirations from both these domains, a condition 
that makes it invaluable to modern society. Kelty notes that the solutions achieved by 
participation will always be close to their points of application, and perhaps, to some 
extent, always temporary as conditions change. 
Even though technologies of tracing are threatening the strangerhood constitutive 
of publics, forms of anonymity have, at the same time, become an important force 
deploying those very techno-mediatic means. What is at stake here is how the erosion of 
one conception of strangerhood seems to reanimate new logics and practices of 
reinstating anonymity at the heart of public life. As Gabriella Coleman suggests in her 
essay on hacker politics, this anonymity is not given; it must be achieved by virtue of an 
entire social, cultural, political, and technological education. Coleman’s focus is on the 
Anonymous movement and its politics of protest and direct action. The essay traces the 
more general practical and historical conditions that shape hacker politics and that inform 
the political conditions of the heterogeneous activities they pursue. In her account, 
Coleman highlights the craftiness of hacking as a practice and suggests that it involves an 
ability to act with some degree of secrecy to evade detection from those who might 
impede one’s agency.  
Politically motivated hacker groups rely on electronic skills and technical 
knowledge to engage in spontaneous forms of protest that support the freedom of the 
Internet. Coleman argues that hacker activism, despite a strong anti-regulatory stance, is 
not reducible to a purely liberal political project. Hackers constitute what Kelty terms a 
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“recursive public,” a public concerned “with the material and practical maintenance and 
modification of the technical, legal, practical, and conceptual means of its own existence 
as a public” (Kelty 2008). The type of activism that Anonymous pursues is driven by the 
desire of actors to make everything public, except their own identity. The social here is 
faceless, as though exposing the phantasmatic nature of the very infrastructures through 
which it operates. Paradoxically, the masking of identity makes identification possible: 
The term anonymous operates as a floating signifier; “it comes to signify a new and much 
expanded kind of anonymity that can potentially include everyone and anyone” (Ravetto-
Biagioli 2013) (p. 180). Contemporary political activism seems to thrive on 
substitutability as its intrinsic populist potential; it hinges on potential belonging and, 
moreover, turns that potential into its very constitutive feature. 
In view of these modalities of potential belonging, we think it important to 
reassess the nature of anonymity. Conventionally, anonymity suggests that the source of a 
message is unclear or unknown. In the case of confidentiality, the identity of the source is 
actively protected from public exposure. Attempts to preserve anonymity are 
paradoxically premised on technologies that enable the capturing and tracing of messages 
back to their sources. In a certain sense, the history of anonymity is thus always also a 
history of its disabling tools. For instance, the development of the telephone network in 
the early twentieth century produced the sense of a person who could hide behind the 
medium while speaking from an inaccessible beyond (Ronell 1989). What was 
identifiable was the origin of the call, not the person calling. Similarly, radio broadcasting 
emerged in a climate of strict laws against “unintended messages,” a notion that was 
linked with nineteenth-century concerns about the ability of radio to promote radical 
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political agendas. The ostensible aim of radio legislation was to protect innocent listeners 
from dangerous messages that were “not in the public interest.” This emphasis on 
regulation and control reveals the enormous preoccupation at the time with techniques of 
accountability in defining the status of subjects, including anonymous subjects. Thus, in 
the early days of the American radio the motivation behind the broadcasting of messages 
itself was archived as a back-up resource in case the intention behind the message was 
lost or became unclear. The motivation behind a message was part of its meaning. This 
practice emerged in response to a rising number of legal cases related to the circulation of 
images and messages thought to be harmful to public decency. Implied in this normative 
space wherein messages were allowed to circulate was a growing awareness about the 
non-linear nature of mass communication. Moreover, this form of communication was 
never just with publics; it was itself formative of publics.  
 To this day, the right to remain anonymous is legally sanctioned as long as one’s 
actions do not injure the very legal order through which such sanctioning is made 
possible. This order assumes as unquestionable the notion that communication must be 
controlled. Anonymity is thus inextricably linked with regimes of regulation, and, most 
of all, with the recognition of the self as a legal entity subject to the law. 
 Both James Siegel and Michael Warner, in their distinct projects, observe how 
mass media have created the conditions of possibility for people to hear or see what was 
not addressed to them in particular (Siegel 1997; Warner 2005; see as well Morris 2017). 
For Siegel, mass media have become the stage for scenes of unintended overhearing: 
public communication opens speech up to a multiplicity of potential receivers, not just 
those who are addressed, but those who might overhear what someone said (see as well 
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(Barker 2008; Rafael 2010; Berlant 2011: 227; Morris 2015). For Warner, this 
multiplicity beyond the intended receiver of a message is itself intrinsic to the notion of 
the public. To be part of a public is to be subsumed under the logic of substitution; one 
can always overhear something else and become part of a discussion somewhere else. In 
fact, the notion of the public implies this very idea of an elsewhere. Warner’s emphasis 
on the public as a sign of the elsewhere is quite distinct from dyadic speech models, 
which assume predefined producers and predefined receivers of messages caught in a 
circuit of communication. The question here is no longer simply who speaks, but what 
are the media through which a speaking is possible. If speech itself is always potentially 
anonymous, it is not because we do not know who speaks, but because speech itself has 
become orphaned, severed from both producer and receiver. 
 The displacement of authorial subjectivity into the spaces of technological 
mediated dissemination relegates all messages, at least potentially, to the status of 
anonymity. In doing so, however, it simultaneously transforms what we conventionally 
mean by anonymity. The notion of the unintentional is crucial here, but it operates under 
a different logic than the one predicated on conventional understandings of authorial 
subjectivity, of propriety and of the subject in general (Rose 1994; Asad 2008). Rather 
than being signified in relation to an origin or a destination, anonymity has become the 
very expression of circulation. Anonymity is that which takes place when words, sounds, 
and images find themselves in transmission, suspended between origin and destination. 
As a number of contributions to this issue demonstrate, such anonymity appears today 
under a variety of social, cultural, political, and economic conditions.  
In Winnie Wong’s account of Shenzhen, a Special Economic Zone at the forefront 
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of the Chinese economic miracle, fears, fictions, and fakes share an analogous structure 
around which anxieties concerning the relation between the true and the false escalate 
(Wong 2017). Rumor seems to be the very foundation of this highly stratified metropolis 
animated by ever-shifting political boundaries, global economic forces, and volatile 
social transactions. As scholars noted, the force of rumor dispenses with the author as an 
anchor of communication. Rumor’s performative power derives from the absence of the 
author as stable point of reference (Das 1998; Guha 1983; Bhabha 1994; Rudé 1959). Its 
efficacy emerges out of its ability to maintain the indeterminacy of the source, which 
facilitates its errant spread. Circulation becomes the defining nature of speech without 
signature. Wong argues that locating rumor in a city like Shenzhen is essential to 
understanding the kind of transformations that are possible in contemporary China.  
Wong reveals what the most prominent and preferred spaces of rumor are within 
the larger politico-economic structure of the region. Such spaces can even generate 
exportable rumor, much like the fake commodities that enter other equally porous borders 
such as the triple border between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay that Alexander Dent 
examines in his essay (Dent 2017). As Dent notes, location is itself a highly porous 
notion, not unlike the digital environments, which promise “to obliterate the customary 
limitations of here and now.” In Brazil and Argentina, a certain type of commodities is 
labeled as distinctively “Paraguayan,” a term used in order to denounce the quality of 
things that look hopelessly imitative and that, in fact, seem to be increasingly 
everywhere. Despite the fact that most of these “Paraguayan” goods are actually from 
China, it is the term Paraguay that has come so signal “an anxiety about a particular 
experience with respect to how technology and mediation, unchecked, can threaten the 
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realness of things.”  
In Rosalind Morris’s contribution the overhearing of speech triggers wider 
reflections on the nature of mediation, circulation, and anonymity (Morris 2017). Many 
media scholars have emphasized how the idea of transparency evokes the fantasy of a 
form of communication without mediation (Sanchez 2008; Meyer 2011; Schulz 2006; 
Eisenlohr 2011; Boyer 2012). Media scholars Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin note that 
new media technologies appear to offer a transparent interface, a medium that “erases 
itself, so that the user is no longer aware of confronting a medium, but instead stands in 
an immediate relationship to the contents of that medium” (Bolter and Grusin 2000) (p. 
24). In her essay, Morris takes issue with this ideology of technology by exposing the 
political force of the fantasy. Morris examines a series of communication failures that 
characterize the heterogeneous public spheres of contemporary South Africa, 
demonstrating how the function of mediation has itself emerged as an object “not of 
deliberation but of an agonistic exchange about the very possibility of exchange.” 
 
Orphan, Speak 
In Foucault’s essay, “What is an Author ?”, the Beckettian theme “Does it matter who is 
speaking,” appears as a form of indifference charged with ethical potential (Foucault 
1998). Yet speech that belongs to no one in particular can also come with the injunction 
to be spoken by everyone. In a recent essay, Didier Fassin described how defenders of 
free speech in France denounced citizens who refused to subscribe to the ubiquitous “Je 
suis Charlie” slogan (Fassin 2015). The political rally that was organized in France in the 
aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks and that was supposed to demonstrate national 
unity is at the center of Zeynep Gürsel’s essay. Focusing on the photographic 
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representation of the rally, Gürsel examines the work that the crowdshot is doing when it 
is put into digital circulation. She describes how the changing conditions of news-making 
have affected processes of authorship and authorization. In the attempt of “not missing 
anything,” international newsroom agencies no longer rely on the ability of professional 
photojournalists to take pictures, but on the images that are already circulating in public 
on digital platforms. The aesthetic value of a good image stems not from its aesthetic 
properties, but rather from the fact that it circulates well. Its effective spread is what turns 
it into news. 
The crowdshots at the center of Gürsel’s essay show heads of state marching in 
front of the crowd. The irony of these images is not their fake nature, nor is it related to 
the fact that the same photographers who made the images exposed their deceit. Rather, 
the irony is that this artificially headed crowd appears in France, the land of the 
beheadings, and of Foucault. In Foucault, the severing of the king’s head in the French 
Revolution concomitantly represents the end of sovereignty as a model of power. The 
beheading thus postulates the end of the sovereign as origin of power. Henceforth, power 
becomes anonymous. It is everywhere, in circulation, so to speak. This is the kind of 
power that the heads of state are trying to capture by entering the space of circulation and 
assuming the characteristics of the crowd itself.  
While the focus on circulation allows one to problematize the excessive 
investment in authorship and intentionality found within Western thought, discussions 
about responsibility and accountability have not received adequate attention (Butler 2005; 
Berlant 2011). Today, in our techno-mediatic milieu, information stored in books appears 
as inaccessible because it is presumably imprisoned in a material form that slows 
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circulation down. In her essay, Mary Murrell explores attempts to improve the book’s 
capacity for circulation (Murrell 2017). Mass-digitalization projects aspire to liberate 
information from the constraints of its material form. Animated by understandings of the 
digital as medium of eternal preservation, these projects come with the promise of 
building future libraries with limitless capacity for storing information. As Derrida 
emphasized, every archive, including the digital archive, finds itself under the 
compulsion to expand the current collection and assemble evermore documents (Derrida 
1996). Its orientation is towards the future. The morally charged metaphor of the 
“orphan” plays an enabling role in this context: “the orphan is a book that runs the risk of 
not being digitized and thus left out of digital libraries, and, indeed, the future.”  
 Contemporary digitalization projects trigger shifts in the overall structural politics 
of archives, libraries, museums, and bookstores. As Murrell suggests, the digitalization of 
the book entails an entire social, cultural, political, and economic infrastructure, 
contributing to the formation of new practices of readership among publics. It is a process 
that involves massive legal battles around the rights that will enable the book to be 
(un)available online. Yet, the very attempt to rescue books from oblivion, she explains, 
risks subjecting such works to the status of the web, where everything ends up “being a 
kind of orphan.” Hence the metaphor of “stewardship,” adopted by engineers and 
entrepreneurs to convey the idea of a responsibility towards the medium itself. The 
steward takes care of the orphaned book without assuming the accountability of the 
author who conceived its content.  
 Digital media offer an unprecedented opportunity for the recirculation of older 
content. As Gürsel’s and Murrell’s contributions indicate, this is a techno-mediatic milieu 
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in which content no longer simply exists in order to be circulated, but where it is the 
evidence of circulation itself that endows content with value. As the mechanisms of 
circulation and citation become ever more powerful, the value of content increasingly 
depends on its “citability” (Weber 1998). Citability, the capacity to circulate, becomes a 
mark of the thing that matters in the world, and hence, evidence and indicator of value. 
At the same time, the spectacular automaticity of the software for the tracing and tracking 
of circulation obscures the politics of distinction involved in the process of defining 
relevance and significance in the first place.  
 
*** 
 
When Montag, at the conclusion of Fahrenheit 451, finally discovers the secret society of 
people who dedicate themselves to preserving through memory books that are threatened 
with extinction, he finds them living far beyond the city, in an edenic forest, the natural 
home of the literate human soul. Only here, far from the techno-mediatic dystopia of the 
city, can the dream of reconciling nature and society, life and thought, be achieved. This 
is a paradise of communication without mediation. Having witnessed the death of his 
substitute on television, Montag is told by one of the Book People how each in the 
community have perfected a method of recalling word-by-word the books they have read; 
how they are part of a secret network of people spread across the country who share bits 
and pieces of different books stored within their memories. The displaced, desocialized 
context in which they find themselves combined with the bodily intensity of their 
routines of recitation and memorization efface the defining features of their own 
individuality. Author and reader meet within the same person, who identifies with the 
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book she reads. Montag, we learn, will become the “Book of Ecclesiastes.” Not unlike 
the digital dream of a quasi-spiritual, dematerialized medium, here the redemptive force 
of the book is realized by its volatilization, its total absorption by human life itself. 
Medium and message coincide without remainder, because people themselves —as 
walking books—become the circulatory form that anchors humanity in its true essence. 
The tension between circulation and capture reaches is apotheosis in a form of life that 
oscillates between absolutes of mediation and self-presence, and seemingly overcomes 
them. Here, Truffaut appears as a contemporary of the current techno-mediatic moment. 
For, indeed, at the heart of this milieu is a desire for an object that will overcome all 
differences, tensions, and contradictions. New media technologies are supposed to 
achieve this through connectivity, though in this technological dreamworld of contact and 
connection, the hierarchies and inequalities of the social world remain largely unchanged. 
It is our hope that the essays collected here will contribute to a social history of such new 
media dreams. 
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